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Molly and the Crack House Statute:
Vulnerabilities of a Recuperating Music
Industry
Jacob A. Epstein *
The normalcy of “club drug” use in today’s live music culture
makes concert promoters and venue managers particularly
vulnerable to prosecution under the “crack-house statute,” 21
U.S.C. § 856. Section 856(a)(2) makes it illegal for a promoter
or venue manager to “manage any place . . . and knowingly and
intentionally . . . profit from, or make available for use . . . the
place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance.” In United States
v. Tebeau, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that third
parties could satisfy the statute’s “intent” requirement. This
Note examines the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation and the
uncertainty that it has created, which may lead to a situation
where any promoter involved in any event where illegal drugs
are consumed can be held liable under Section 856. This Note
calls for an amendment to the statute, better designed (1) to curb
dangerous club drug use, (2) to provide health and safety
measures for patrons, and (3) to punish, specifically, rogue
concert promoters who facilitate such dangerous situations, so
that the many positive economic effects of the live music sector
may continue to flourish.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Calvin Harris made an astounding $46 million in 2012, and the
estimated $300,000 he made for one night’s performance in August of
2013 was well worth the expense to his Las Vegas-based promoter. 1
Today, numbers like these are increasingly common as the music

1

Ryan Mac and Zack O’Malley Greenburg, Sin City’s Latest Savior, FORBES, Sept. 2,
2013, at 44.
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industry continues to derive profits from festivals and concerts.2 Music
festivals like Ultra, 3 Bonnaroo, 4 Coachella, 5 and Austin City Limits 6
have become household names, as music fans young and old flock to
cities all over the country each year to see their favorite musicians
perform.
While those in the industry are excited by the rising prevalence of
this source of revenue, the dangers associated with large crowds of
people congregating in one, high-energy atmosphere are palpable. 7 Drug
use at music festivals and concerts is rampant. 8 “Club drug” use,
combined with high temperatures and the inevitable dehydration
resulting from such situations, led to at least seven deaths between March
and September of 2013. 9 Should concert promoters and venue managers
be held responsible for the drug use at their events? If so, how can they
be expected to prevent these drugs, some of which are no smaller than
your average Tylenol pill, from entering a venue? The pervasiveness of
these drugs at music festivals today, and the lack of any comprehensive
legal guidance as to how concert promoters and venue managers should
handle the situation, has created a grey area where their liability for such
activities is unclear.
Concert promoters and venue managers are especially vulnerable to
prosecution under the “crack house statute,” 21 U.S.C. § 856, due to the
statute’s over-inclusiveness and unclear language. The statute’s
shortcomings are vividly illustrated in United States v. Tebeau, where the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found an organizer of an outdoor music
festival criminally liable under Section 856(a)(2). 10 Tebeau, the
defendant, filed a petition for certiorari (the “Petition”) in July 2013,
arguing that the Eighth Circuit’s finding that he “knowingly and
intentionally” made his premises available for drug use was an invalid

2

See Chris Parker, The Economics of Music Festivals: Who’s Getting Rich, Who’s
Going Broke?, LA WEEKLY (Apr. 17, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://blogs.laweekly.com
/westcoastsound/2013/04/economics_of_music_festivals.php.
3
ULTRA MUSIC FESTIVAL, http://www.ultramusicfestival.com (last visited Sept. 19,
2014).
4
BONNAROO MUSIC AND ARTS FESTIVAL, http://www.bonnaroo.com (last visited Sept.
20, 2014).
5
COACHELLA VALLEY MUSIC AND ARTS FESTIVAL, http://www.coachella.com/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2014).
6
AUSTIN CITY LIMITS MUSIC FESTIVAL, http://www.aclfestival.com (last visited Sept.
20, 2014).
7
See Ben Sisario & James C. McKinley, Jr., Drug Deaths Threaten Rising Business
of Electronic Music Fests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2013, at A1.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013).
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and overly zealous conclusion.11 The Supreme Court’s hasty denial 12 of
the Petition will likely have enormous implications for the music
industry, creating a dangerous zone of liability for many concert
promoters and venue managers who will be left with little guidance on
how to prevent a situation analogous to Tebeau’s. Moreover, corporate
sponsors and promoters may be less inclined to participate in certain
types of music festivals, especially those that are associated with heavy
drug use, for fear of the inevitable liability that will eventually become
associated with those festivals.
This Note will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of Tebeau’s
arguments and supplement his points with the business and drug-culture
realities of the music industry today. Section II will specifically illustrate
the current state of the live music industry, addressing both its positive
and negative aspects. Section III will present the crack house statute, the
purposes for its enactment, and the 2003 amendment to the statute that is
at issue in the Petition. Section IV will explain the facts of the Tebeau
case, the arguments put forth, and the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning. Section
V will argue that, as it stands, the statute is a hindrance to the music
industry. Section V will subsequently propose another amendment to the
crack house statute, one that would address the concerns outlined in this
Note, suggesting additional requirements that venue managers and
concert promoters take “reasonable precautions” to prevent illicit
activities at their events and to ensure that medical attention for patrons
is readily available. Section V will then clarify the reasoning behind the
proposed amendment, the main goals of which are to allow a positive
trend in the music industry to thrive and to protect the health and safety
of live music fans.

II.
A.

SETTING THE STAGE

The Trend Toward More Music Festivals Is Significant.

The global recorded music industry in 2012 saw its first rise in
revenue since 1999 largely due to the increase in digital music sales. 13
Global digital revenues climbed nine percent, according to the

11

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tebeau v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 314 (No. 13146) (2013).
12
See Tebeau v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 314 (2013).
13
Richard Smirke, IFPI Digital Music Report 2013: Global Recorded Music Revenues
Climb for First Time Since 1999, BILLBOARD (Feb. 26, 2013, 8:52 AM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/1549915/ifpi-digitalmusic-report-2013-global-recorded-music.
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International Federation of the Phonographic Industry’s 14 2013 Digital
Music Report, 15 helping to raise global digital music revenues to $5.6
billion, up from $5.1 billion in 2011.16 While the media tends to focus on
digital music’s role in saving the recorded music industry, 17 the lack of
attention to live music’s contribution to the industry as a whole is
remarkable.
In 2010, corporate concert promoter Live Nation merged with ticket
vendor Ticketmaster to create Live Nation Entertainment.18 Live Nation
Entertainment, now a giant in the industry, had a record summer in 2013,
bringing in $2.3 billion of revenue. 19 According to Billboard,20
worldwide concert ticket sales increased approximately thirty percent
between 2012 and 2013. 21 Because hundreds of thousands of people are
often willing to spend between three and four hundred dollars on one
festival pass, corporate sponsors are inevitably attracted to such events.
Live Nation Entertainment’s Sponsorship & Advertising segment had a
fifteen percent increase in revenue between the third quarter of 2012 and
the third quarter of 2013. 22 Although still a very new festival series, the
Made In America Festival landed Budweiser as its corporate sponsor. 23
The 2014 Bonnaroo Music and Arts Festival had a list of major corporate
sponsors that included, but was certainly not limited to, Miller Lite, Ford,
Gap, and Ben & Jerry’s. 24 Coachella’s sponsors in 2014 included

14
The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (the “IFPI”) represents
“the interests of 1,300 record companies from across the globe.” See IFPI,
http://www.ifpi.org/about.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
15
IFPI Digital Music Report 2013 http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2013.pdf at
6.
16
Id.
17
See Eric Pfanner, Music Industry Sales Rise, and Digital Revenue Gets the Credit,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at B3.
18
TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/about/about-us.html (last visited Sept.
20, 2014).
19
Live Nation, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 3 (November 5, 2013) [hereinafter Live
Nation Third Quarter Report].
20
Known as “the world’s premier music publication,” Billboard’s “popular music
charts have evolved into the primary source of information on trends and innovation in
music, serving music fans, artists, top executives, tour promoters, publishers, radio
programmers, lawyers, retailers, digital entrepreneurs and many others.” See BILLBOARD,
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/467859/about-us (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
21
Ray Waddell, Live and On Fire, BILLBOARD, Dec. 21, 2013, at 44.
22
See Live Nation Third Quarter Report, supra note 19, at 34.
23
BUDWEISER MADE IN AMERICA FESTIVAL, http://budweisermadeinamericafestival
.tumblr.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
24
BONNAROO PARTNERS, http://www.bonnaroo.com//get-involved/partners/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2014).
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Heineken, H&M, Samsung, and Red Bull. 25 The prevalence of live music
as a source of revenue, corporate sponsorship, and consumer
involvement is now undeniable.

B.

This Trend is Beneficial and Should Be Encouraged.

Music festivals transform their host cities or towns into music-fan
destinations, a transformation that not only helps the industry at large,
but also pours millions of dollars into these cities’ revenue streams. In
2012, the Washington Economics Group estimated that the Ultra Music
Festival contributes approximately $79 million into the Miami-Dade
County economy each year. 26 The local economic benefits of music
festivals are not limited to major tourist cities like Miami; indeed, dozens
of other cities see their economies skyrocket in the weeks surrounding
their major festivals. Every spring, some of the best jazz and rock
musicians in the world travel to New Orleans, Louisiana, for The New
Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival.27 It is estimated that “Jazz Fest,” 28
which began in 1970, now attracts approximately 400,000 attendees and
generates approximately $300 million each year.29 These economic
benefits are conspicuous and not just to the residents of a city like New
Orleans, which is known for its vibrant live music scene.
Concerts and music festivals provide a stream of income to local
food, alcohol, and merchandise vendors, hotels and restaurants, and taxi
services. While the album cover and record store advertisements clearly
do their parts, an artist’s best publicity arguably comes from a great live
performance. In addition to increasing their fan bases at music festivals
by being exposed to attendees who had never before seen particular
artists, most concert and festival promoters allow artists to sell their own
merchandise at events.
While the economic benefits of concerts and festivals are plentiful,
this sector of the industry has an unfortunate dark side. When thousands
of young, dance-hungry patrons congregate in one confined space, health
and safety problems are bound to surface. Dangerous drug use at these
25

COACHELLA SPONSORS, http://www.coachella.com/festival-info/sponsors (last visited
Sept. 21, 2014).
26
Hannah Sampson, Ultra Music Festival Pours Millions into Economy, Study Says,
MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/10/3042176/ultramusic-festival-pours-millions.html.
27
NEW ORLEANS JAZZ & HERITAGE FESTIVAL, http://www.nojazzfest.com (last visited
Sept. 21, 2014).
28
The New Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival is more commonly known as “Jazz Fest.”
29
Adriana Lopez, New Orleans Jazz Fest Comes Full Circle with Its Mission, FORBES
(May 6, 2013, 4:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adrianalopez/2013/05/06/neworleans-jazz-fest-comes-full-circle-with-its-mission/.
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events has become a stark reality in recent years; as the public becomes
aware of this reality, a looming threat to the live-music industry will
continue to grow.

C.
The Pervasiveness of Drug Use at Music Festivals Is
Substantial.
It was 107 degrees on Governor’s Island when twenty-year-old
Matthew Rybarczyk collapsed at the 2013 Electric Zoo Festival in New
York. 30 Fourteen hours after his grandmother visited him in the hospital,
the young man was dead. 31 A significant amount of the party drug,
“Molly,” was found in his system. 32
Deaths from drug use at music festivals are not uncommon; between
March and September of 2013, at least seven people attending electronic
dance music (“EDM”) festivals died after exhibiting symptoms
consistent with “party drug” overdoses. 33 When the death toll reached
two at the 2013 Electric Zoo Festival, the entire event was cut short, as
the dangers quickly began to outweigh any benefit of following through
with the planned set list. 34 These tragic losses of life may have drastic
effects on the music industry as “[e]xecutives say that deaths like these
have the potential to scare off investors and the corporate sponsors that
are eager to reach the genre’s young, affluent and technologically
connected fans.” 35
Ecstasy, or MDMA, became prevalent in the late 1990s and early
2000s. 36 “Molly,” which is slang for a pure, powder or crystal form of
MDMA, 37 has become popular at music festivals in recent years.38 While
the media initially associated MDMA with a “deviant youth
subculture,” 39 often tied to the “rave scene,” 40 modern EDM has
arguably adopted many of the rave scene’s problematic aspects, as
30

Sisario & McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See Jon Pareles, Dancing in the Eternal Present, Before Harsh Reality Intervened,
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 2, 2013, at C1.
35
Sisario & McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1.
36
Deborah Ahrens, Drug Panics in the Twenty-First Century: Ecstasy, Prescription
Drugs, and the Reframing of the War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 397, 404 (2013).
37
See DrugFacts: MDMA (Ecstasy or Molly), NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE,
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/mdma-ecstasy-or-molly (last visited
Sep. 26, 2014).
38
See Sisario & McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1.
39
Ahrens, supra note 36, at 412.
40
Shadi Kardan, Comment, The Government’s New War on Drugs: Threatening the
Right to Dance!, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 99, 100-03 (2003).
31
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evidenced by the aforementioned MDMA-related deaths. Although raves
were distinctive in the late 1990s and early 2000s, largely because of the
electronic music and “underground” nature of such events,41 today such
music has migrated from the fringes of society to the mainstream music
culture.
There is a subtle, yet clearly problematic, endorsement of the rave
culture in modern-day EDM. Madonna, known more for her pop music
than her recent endeavor into EDM, titled her twelfth studio album
“MDNA.” 42 The pop star’s not-so-subtle play on words demonstrates
how the mainstream music culture has come to embrace, albeit not
directly, the club drug culture. Madonna, as a major pop star and
representative of the mainstream music culture, has perpetuated the
normalization of club drug use through her actions. During her 2012
performance at Ultra, Madonna allegedly screamed to the crowd, “How
many people in this crowd have seen ‘Molly’?” 43
The EDM fan base is growing: as of September 2013, the EDM
industry was estimated to be worth $4.5 billion. 44 It is no secret that the
artists and promoters in the business are aware of the rampant drug use at
their festivals, so for the sake of continued growth of the live music
industry, these problems must be addressed. And as long as this culture
remains the status quo, there is at least one federal law 45 that poses a
significant danger to the music industry. 46

III.

THE CRACK HOUSE STATUTE

A.
The Substance and Purpose of the Original Crack House
Statute
Section (a)(1) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, also known as
the “crack house statute,” made it illegal to “knowingly open or maintain
any place, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any
controlled substance.” 47 Section (a)(2) of the statute made it illegal to

41

Id. at 101.
MADONNA, MDNA (Interscope Records 2012).
43
Pareles, supra note 34, at C1. Madonna is not the only major pop star to make such a
reference. “Today, stars like Miley Cyrus and Kanye West allude to molly in songs, and
the term turns up repeatedly at festivals, on T-shirts, banners or body paint.” Sisario &
McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1.
44
Sisario & McKinley, Jr., supra note 7, at A1.
45
See infra Part III.
46
See infra Part IV-V.
47
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (1986).
42
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manage or control any building, room, or enclosure,
either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, or
mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease,
or make available for use, with or without compensation,
the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of
unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using
a controlled substance. 48
The original crack house statute was designed to punish those who
used their property to run drug businesses. 49 Congress explained that one
of the 1986 Act’s functions was to “outla[w] [the] operation of houses or
buildings, so-called ‘crack houses,’ where ‘crack,’ cocaine and other
drugs are manufactured and used.” 50 The 1986 Act, as the name suggests,
addressed a very specific problem during the height of the 1980’s crack
epidemic. 51 The statute’s nickname, the “crack house statute,” was
wholly appropriate as the original wording of the statute made it very
clear whom the statute was targeting. 52

B.

The 2003 Amendment to the Crack House Statute

In 2003, the statute was amended to its present language. 53 Although
the “knowingly” and “for the purpose” clauses from the original 1986
version remain in Section (a)(1), the 2003 amendment broadened the
statute to also include those who “lease, rent, or use . . . any place,
whether permanently or temporarily.” 54 Section (a)(2) of the statute now
makes it illegal to
manage or control any place, whether permanently or
temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee,
occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally
rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with
or without compensation, the place for the purpose of

48

§ 856(a)(2).
See U.S. v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir. 1995).
50
132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (1986).
51
See 132 CONG. REC. 14,097-99 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles); H.R.J. Res. 678,
99th Cong. (1986).
52
§ 856(a)(2). The original crack house statute targeted specifically those who
controlled any building, room, or enclosure who made that property available for the use,
distribution, manufacture or storage of illegal drugs.
53
See Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, S. 226, 108th Cong. (2003).
54
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012).
49
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unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using
a controlled substance. 55
A person convicted under this statute may be sentenced to a prison
term of up to twenty years or “a fine of not more than $500,000, or both,
or a fine of $2,000,000 for a person other than an individual.” 56
Moreover, one who violates this statute may be liable for civil
penalties. 57
The 2003 amendment expanded the range of people who may be
affected by the statute, thereby increasing the possibility that Section
856(a)(1) could be deemed unconstitutionally vague if construed
expansively. 58 The specificity of the 1986 crack house statute was
diminished, as the 2003 amendment enabled the crack house statute to be
applied to “single-event” activities, not just to ongoing drug distribution
operations. 59 The amendment clarified that a “one-time event . . . where
the promoter knowingly distributes [drugs] over the course of an
evening . . . violates the statute the same as a crack house which is in
operation over a period of time.” 60 Moreover, the amendment made the
statute apply to outdoor as well as indoor venues in order to reach rogue
promoters that used fields to distribute controlled substances. 61
Drafted at a time when ecstasy usage was considered a grave
problem, the 2003 amendment was originally referred to as the RAVE
Act, which stood for “Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy
Act.” 62 The RAVE Act, however, was highly criticized due to the
findings section of the bill, which accused property owners and rave
promoters of being intentional profiteers of illicit drug use. 63 As a result,
the RAVE Act died at the end of 2002, until former Senator, and current
Vice President, Joe Biden reintroduced a slightly modified version in
February of 2003, which took out the controversial findings section.64

55

21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
21 U.S.C. § 856(b) (2012).
57
21 U.S.C. § 856(d) (2012).
58
See Shetler, F.3d at 1164.
59
149 CONG. REC. 1847 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy (RAVE) Act, H.R. 718, 108th
Cong. (2003).
63
See 148 CONG. REC. 10,671 (2002).
64
See Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, S. 226, 108th Cong. (2003); 149
CONG. REC. 1846, 1847 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
56
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The bill was re-named the “Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act,” and it
was attached as a rider to the Amber Alert Bill, which Congress passed. 65

C.
The Purpose of the 2003 Amendment to the Crack House
Statute
Senator Grassley, a co-sponsor of the 2003 bill, explained why the
crack house statute needed to be updated: “[I]t is important that we
update the laws that have been effectively used to shut down crack
houses so they can go after temporary events used as a cover to sell
drugs.” 66 He further explained, “as drug dealers discover new drugs and
new methods of pushing their poison, we must make sure our legal
system is adequately structured to react appropriately. I believe this
legislation does that.” 67 Senator Biden emphasized that the 2003 version
of the statute was specifically intended to prohibit ecstasy use and to
simultaneously target the problematic “Rave Scene” at the time:
This legislation arises out of a hearing Senator Grassley
and I held in the Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control in December 2001 on the proliferation
of Ecstasy and other club drugs generally, and the role of
some promoters of all-night dance parties, known as
‘‘raves’’, in distributing Ecstasy to young people. Our
bill provides Federal prosecutors the tools needed to
combat the manufacture, distribution or use of any
controlled substance at any venue whose purpose is to
engage in illegal narcotics activity. 68
Senator Grassley noted the dangers of ecstasy and detailed how
certain promoters take advantage of the drug’s use at their shows:
Ecstasy raises the heart rate to dangerous levels, and in
some cases the heart will stop. It also causes severe
dehydration, a condition that is exacerbated by the high
levels of physical exertion that happens at raves. Users
must constantly drink water in an attempt to cool off—a
fact that some unscrupulous event promoters take
advantage of by charging exorbitant fees for bottles of
65
See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); 149 CONG. REC. 1847
(2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
66
149 CONG. REC. 1849 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
67
Id. at 1848.
68
149 CONG. REC. 1846 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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water, after cutting off water to drinking fountains and
rest room sinks. Too often, Ecstasy users collapse and
die because their bodies overheat.69
Senator Biden addressed, even at this introductory juncture, his
critics’ concerns with the bill, yet he explicitly denied that the
amendment would be used to target concert promoters:
We know that there will always be certain people who
will bring drugs into musical or other events and use
them without the knowledge or permission of the
promoter or club owner. This is not the type of activity
that my bill would address. The purpose of my
legislation is not to prosecute legitimate law-abiding
managers of stadiums, arenas, performing arts centers,
licensed beverage facilities and other venues because
of incidental drug use at their events. In fact, when
crafting this legislation, I took steps to ensure that it did
not capture such cases. My bill would help in the
prosecution of rogue promoters who not only know that
there is drug use at their event but also hold the event
for the purpose of illegal drug use or distribution. 70
Senator Biden continuously stressed that the statute would not target
responsible promoters, 71 noting, “neither current law nor my bill seeks to
punish a promoter for the behavior of their patrons.”72 He even described
the type of promoters he was targeting:
[T]here are a few promoters out there who are taking
steps to profit from drug activity at their events. Some of
these folks actually distribute drugs themselves or have
their staff distribute drugs, get kickbacks from drug sales
at their events, have thinly veiled drug messages on their
promotional flyers, tell their security to ignore drug use
or sales, or send patients who need medical attention
because of a drug overdose to a hospital across town so
that people won’t link emergency room visits with their
club. 73

69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 1848 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
Id. at 1847 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Biden explained that he did not intend to provide “a disincentive for
promoters to take steps to protect the public health of their patrons
including providing water or air conditioned rooms, making sure that
there is an ambulance on the premises, etc.” 74 He explicitly noted, “there
are legitimate reasons for selling water, having a room where people can
cool down after dancing, or having an ambulance on hand. Clearly, the
presence of any of these things is not enough to signify that an event is
‘for the purpose of’ drug use.” 75 His statements indicate that the statute
was not designed to discourage promoters from taking safety precautions
nor was it designed to prevent these types of concerts from taking place.
Biden clarified, “If rave promoters and sponsors operate such events as
they are so often advertised as places for people to come dance in a safe,
drug-free environment then they have nothing to fear from this law. In no
way is this bill aimed at stifling any type of music or expression[;] it is
only trying to deter illicit drug use and protect kids.” 76 The legislative
record and the wording of the statute itself suggest that its goal was to
curb drug use on a larger scale, however, the statute’s ambiguous nature
has allowed it to be used for other purposes.

IV.
A.

UNITED STATES V. TEBEAU

Introduction

What happens when the crack house statute is used to go after a
concert promoter? 77 When the court allows the intent requirement of the
statute to be satisfied by third parties, it potentially creates a zone of
liability where any concert promoter can be convicted under the statute
due to the rampant drug use that occurs at many music festivals and
concerts. In United States v. Tebeau, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the validity of the crack house statute and effectively deemed an
organizer of an outdoor music festival as criminally liable under the
crack house statute. 78 Tebeau’s conviction and the Supreme Court’s
denial of his Petition should raise awareness as to the problematic
aspects of the statute’s current form.

74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Id. at 1847-48.
Id. at 1848.
See United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013).
Id.
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B.

Facts and Procedural History of United States v. Tebeau

James Tebeau owned approximately three hundred acres of land in
Shannon County, Missouri, which he frequently utilized to promote a
series of weekend music festivals.79 Festival attendees would pay sixty
dollars to enter Tebeau’s property for three-day festivals, and the number
in attendance at each festival ranged from 3,600 to nearly 8,000.80 After
several drug-related arrests near the property, undercover law
enforcement officers conducted an operation at his festivals, making over
150 controlled purchases of illegal drugs.81 “The officers observed 100 to
200 drug dealers at each festival and estimated that approximately
$500,000 worth of illegal drugs was sold at each event.”82 The officers
witnessed open drug use and open drug sales among festival attendees, as
many dealers refrained from using any sort of discretion. 83
Tebeau was present at each of these festivals.84 Aware that the drug
use and drug sales were going on, Tebeau took the precaution to set up a
medical facility on the premises known as “Safestock,” where attendees
who had overdosed on dangerous drugs could be treated. 85 He instructed
his employees that certain types of drugs, including marijuana, LSD, and
mushrooms, were permissible at the events. 86 “According to employees,
Tebeau instructed security guards in the camp to move sellers away from
the front gates to avoid detection by law enforcement officers.” 87 After
officers executed a search warrant in November 2010, Tebeau was later
indicted for managing drug-involved premises in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 856 (a)(2). 88
Tebeau moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the government
did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that “he had the specific
intent to sell drugs on his property.” 89 After the district court denied the
motion, Tebeau entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to
appeal the motion.90 In the plea agreement, the government stipulated
that Tebeau had not personally participated in any drug sales, but Tebeau
admitted that he had “intended [his property to] be made available” for
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 957.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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people “who had the intent to sell and use controlled substances.”91
Although undercover officers alleged that they made some drug
purchases in the presence of festival security, Tebeau did not stipulate to
that fact in his plea. 92 However, he did agree that 700 kilograms of
marijuana had likely been distributed on his premises. 93
The district court sentenced Tebeau to thirty months imprisonment,
two years of supervised release, and a $50,000 fine, and he was required
to forfeit his property to the government. 94 Tebeau appealed the district
court’s denial of his motion to dismiss to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s finding. 95 Most notably, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that Tebeau did not need to have the illegal
purpose proscribed by the statute 96; rather, the various people who
attended the festivals on his property could fulfill the statute’s required
illegal purpose. 97 Tebeau filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States on July 29, 2013, challenging the Eighth
Circuit’s decision. 98 However, the Supreme Court denied the Petition on
October 7, 2013. 99

C.

Tebeau’s Textual Argument

Tebeau argued that the district court’s reading of Section 856(a)(2)
conflicted with the statute’s textual and legislative history and that the
statute should be interpreted to require proof that he specifically intended
illegal drugs to be manufactured, stored, distributed, or used on his
property. 100 The district court found that no such proof was required;
instead, the court found that the statute only required the government to
show that Tebeau intended to make his property available for others who
had that purpose. 101
The Eighth Circuit, without any binding precedent in the context of
music festivals, relied on other circuit courts of appeal to determine how
91

Id.
Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing at 18-20, United States v. Tebeau, No. 1:11cr-00083-SNLJ (E.D. Mo. 2012) (No. 113).
93
Id. at 19.
94
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 18-25, United States v. Tebeau, No. 1:11-cr00083-SNLJ (E.D. Mo. 2012) (No. 101).
95
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 963.
96
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) prohibits one to “manage or control any place . . . and
knowingly and intentionally . . . make available for use . . . the place for the purpose of
unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.”
97
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 961.
98
See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11.
99
Tebeau v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 314 (2013).
100
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 958-59.
101
Id. at 959.
92
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to interpret the statute. 102 More specifically, the Eighth Circuit examined
the decision in United States v. Chen, where the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the government did not need to show that a
property owner had the purpose of storing, distributing, using, or
manufacturing a controlled substance in order to convict her under
Section 856(a)(2). 103 In Chen, the Fifth Circuit concluded, “the phrase
for the purpose of applies to the person who opens or maintains the place
for the illegal activity.” 104 However, the Fifth Circuit also concluded that
under Section 856(a)(2), “the person who manages or controls the
[property] . . . need not have the express purpose . . . that drug related
activity is taking place,” as long as others on the property have that
purpose. 105 The Fifth Circuit reasoned, “[i]t is well established that a
statute should be construed so that each of its provisions is given its full
effect; interpretations which render parts of a statute inoperative or
superfluous are to be avoided.” 106 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found
that Section 856 (a)(2) would be redundant if it required the same actorspecific intent already necessitated by Section 856 (a)(1). 107
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit analyzed United States v. Tamez, where
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the “‘plain meaning
and interrelation of the two [Section] 856 provisions suggest that Section
856(a)(2) does not require proof that the defendant intended to use a
property for a prohibited purpose.” 108 The Eighth Circuit also referenced
United States v. Wilson, where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found that any other reading of Section 856(a)(1) and Section 856 (a)(2)
would “conflate [the] two subsections, rendering one superfluous.” 109
Based on the reasoning of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts,
the Eighth Circuit found that Section 856 (a)(2) did not require proof that
Tebeau had the illegal purpose to use, manufacture, sell, or distribute
controlled substances. 110 Rather, it was sufficient that Tebeau intended to
make his property available to others who had that purpose.111
In the Petition, Tebeau argued that, because Section 856 (a)(2) adds
“storing” to the list of prohibitions in the statute, that particular provision
102

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990)).
104
See Chen, 913 F.2d at 190.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 856(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
108
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 960 (quoting United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 774 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
109
Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
110
Id. at 961.
111
Id.
103
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is not wholly superfluous with Section (a)(1) if read on its own. 112 His
argument contrasted with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, which
maintained that, because Section 856(a)(1) contained an intent
requirement for the actor, an identical requirement in Section 856(a)(2)
would be “superfluous” or unnecessary. 113 According to Tebeau, if the
actor had as part of his illegal purpose renting the place to another for the
purpose of storing a controlled substance, that person could be
prosecuted only under Section 856 (a)(2) but not under Section 856
(a)(1). 114 Tebeau argued that the Eighth Circuit violated a wellestablished statutory rule: that “identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” 115 If the prohibited
purpose in Section 856 (a)(1) unambiguously applied to the actor in the
statute, then Section 856 (a)(2) had to be interpreted in the same manner
because it shared the same grammatical structure with Section 856
(a)(1). 116 “Although there is some overlap between the two provisions,
each section captured [prohibited] conduct that the other did not.”117
Finally, Tebeau argued that his interpretation of the statute was
consistent with congressional intent 118 and was mandated by the rule of
lenity. 119 Tebeau pointed to former senator, and co-sponsor of the 2003
Amendment to the statute, Joe Biden’s comments,120 which purportedly
underscored his point that the actor in the statute must possess the illegal
purpose prohibited by Section 856 (a)(2) to be convicted under the
statute. 121

112

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 20.
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 960; see also Wilson, 503 F.3d at 198; Chen, 913 F.2d at 190.
114
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 8.
115
Id. at 20 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995)).
116
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 21. Tebeau argued that the Eighth
Circuit essentially read Section 856 (a)(2) as follows: “it shall be unlawful to manage or
control . . . and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for
use . . . the place [to others who have] the purpose . . . ” Id.
117
Id. at 8; see 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012). The “storing” prohibition is found in section
(a)(2), but not in section (a)(1).
118
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 23.
119
See id. at 24. “The purposes underlying the rule of lenity [are] to promote fair notice
to those subject to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective or arbitrary
enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and
courts.” See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
120
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 23; see 149 Cong. Rec. 1847 (2003)
(statement of Sen. Biden); see also infra Part III-C.
121
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 24.
113
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Tebeau also argued that his indictment was deficient pursuant to
Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 122 because there
was no allegation that Tebeau was personally involved in any illicit drug
transaction. 123 Therefore, he could not possess the illegal purpose
proscribed by the statute. 124 The government conceded that there were no
such allegations but argued that this was irrelevant because the
indictment tracked the language of the statute, and the main purpose of
many of the campers who attended the festival was to sell and use
drugs. 125 The Eighth Circuit rejected Tebeau’s procedural argument,
concluding “[t]he indictment sufficiently described Tebeau’s offense
conduct in making his property available for illegal use.” 126

E.

Tebeau’s Due Process Argument

Tebeau further argued that the court’s interpretation of the statute as
lacking a specific intent requirement rendered the statute
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 127
Specifically, Tebeau contended that by allowing the statute’s intent
requirement to be satisfied by third parties, the defendant does not
receive the necessary “notice” required by due process. 128 Such an
interpretation would enable the government to enforce the statute
selectively, thus giving festival promoters no guidance as to what level of
precautions they could lawfully make available to treat attendees who
use drugs at music festivals. 129
The Eighth Circuit, however, found that the statute provided
sufficient notice. 130 The court utilized the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’
decision in United States v. Rosa, which found that Section 856(a)(2)
“furnishes fair notice that it is illegal for a homeowner to knowingly and
intentionally allow her house to be used in the distribution of drugs.” 131
122

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). “The indictment or information must be a plain, concise,
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged . . . .A count may allege that the means by which the defendant committed the
offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means.”
Id.
123
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 6.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 963.
127
Id. at 961; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
128
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 961.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. (quoting United States v. Rosa, 50 F. App’x 226, 227 (6th Cir. 2008)).
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Based on the Rosa reasoning, the Eighth Circuit found that “the inclusion
of a specific mens rea element 132 provided[ed] fair notice to Tebeau and
others that certain conduct [addressed in the statute] is prohibited.” 133
The court found no evidence to support the proposition that Section 856
(a)(2) itself led to any arbitrary enforcement. 134 The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the open and obvious drug-use taking place on Tebeau’s
property was “precisely the conduct prohibited by [Section] 856(a)(2)’s
plain language, and the statute therefore was not unconstitutionally vague
as applied to Tebeau.” 135
The court failed to address what precautions a property owner could
take to avoid liability under the crack house statute.136 Tebeau asserted
that the court mistakenly dismissed his arbitrary enforcement claim,
when it summarily concluded that he had provided no evidentiary
support for his argument. 137 Notably, the court failed to address his claim
that the prosecution did not comport with existing DEA guidelines138 and
that it did not address the many instances of music festivals in Missouri
and surrounding states with similar drug-related problems but no
prosecutions. 139
Tebeau relied on Supreme Court reasoning that “[a] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates this first essential of due process of law.” 140
He distinguished Rosa on the basis that the defendant in that case
allowed people to use and sell drugs in her house. 141 Such a distinction
was critical because controlling activities that occur in one’s house is
substantially different than controlling activities of thousands of people
spread over a 350-acre property. 142
132
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “mens rea” as “[t]he state
of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had
when committing a crime.”).
133
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 961.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 961-62.
136
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 14.
137
See id.
138
“Tebeau noted that his prosecution did not appear to follow the guidelines published
by the Drug Enforcement Administration . . . on its own website.” Id. at 9-10.
139
Id. at 14. “Tebeau noted that no other concert promoter and/or outdoor music
festival organizer had been prosecuted in this district or surrounding district . . . .Tebeau
introduced evidence of a number of music festivals in Missouri and surrounding states
where significant illicit drug activity was taking place, including drug-related injuries and
deaths.” Id. at 10.
140
Id. at 25 (citing Connolly v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
141
Id. at 26; Rosa, 50 F. App’x at 227-28.
142
Id.
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Tebeau supplemented his vagueness argument by contending that the
precautions he took to ensure the safety of festival attendees were used
against him to establish his liability, just as they were used against the
owners of the State Palace Theatre in the case of McClure v. Ashcroft. 143
In McClure, an analogous situation existed where owners of a theatre
were prosecuted in violation of Section 856 (a)(2) after an investigation
showed that approximately seventy patrons had been transported from
their theatre to the hospital for drug overdoses. 144 Because of the
statutory interpretation advanced in Chen, the government was able to
prosecute the theatre’s owners even though they were not personally
involved in the sale or distribution of drugs. 145
Despite precautions taken by the owners, it was not
enough to avoid liability; rather, such precautions were
used against the owners to establish liability. For
example, the theater had medical personnel and an
ambulance service on hand to assist or transport anyone
in need. Yet, the Government argued that this very fact
showed that the owners and promoters knew that patrons
were likely to suffer the effects of drugs and alcohol. 146
By allowing the purpose element to be satisfied by the acts of others,
a property owner is placed in a “Catch 22.” 147 If venue managers and
concert promoters do not provide safety precautions for the inevitable
drug users at their events, they may be prosecuted or sued for their
failure to do so; but, if they take those precautions, Tebeau argued, it
could be used against them for Section 856 (a)(2) purposes.148 “Absent
such a safe harbor, the only guaranteed way for a music promoter . . . to
avoid liability under the [crack house] statute is to not hold the event at
all.” 149

143

Id. at 28; see generally McClure v. Ashcroft 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
McClure, 335 F.3d at 406. The Fifth Circuit dismissed McClure, finding it nonjusticiable because “in a civil proceeding, at least under circumstances similar to those
presented in this action, a third-party collateral attack on a final criminal judgment is
nonjusticiable.” Id. at 414.
145
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 28.
146
Id. (citing McClure v. Ashcroft, No. CIV A 01-2573, 2002 WL 188410 (E.D. La.
Feb. 1, 2002)).
147
Id. at 29.
148
Id.
149
Id.
144

2014]

F.

MOLLY AND THE CRACK HOUSE STATUTE

115

Tebeau’s First Amendment Argument

Because the statute leaves a promoter or venue manager with little
guidance how to avoid liability, Tebeau contended, the Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation of Section 856(a)(2) violates his First Amendment rights
by effectively preventing him, as well as other promoters, from
organizing music festivals. 150 The cumulative effect of the court’s
statutory interpretation would be the “chilling” of free speech,
particularly the freedom of expression associated with music festivals.151
In analyzing his argument, the Eighth Circuit utilized the standard set
forth in United States v. O’Brien:
Where “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are
combined in the same course of conduct,” the
government regulation is justified if (1) “it is within the
constitutional power of the Government,” (2) “it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest,” (3)
“the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression,” and (4) “the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.” 152
In Tebeau’s case, only the third and fourth O’Brien elements are at
issue. 153 With respect to the third element, Tebeau argued that Section
856(a)(2) fails “because it was originally aimed at eliminating music
festivals with high drug use,” and music festivals are a form of protected
speech. 154 He further contended that “Section 856(a)(2) . . . fails to
satisfy the fourth element because it too broadly punishes organizers and
promoters of music festivals.” 155 The Eighth Circuit, however, concluded
the statute satisfied the O’Brien test and was therefore consistent with the
First Amendment. 156 The court reasoned that “the government interest in
regulating drug use is unrelated to any incidental impact the law has on
music festivals” 157 and that “a prohibition on knowingly making
premises available for drug use imposes only an incidental restriction on
150

Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 962.
Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 10.
152
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 962 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77
(1968)).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
151

116

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:95

music festival hosts which does not ‘significantly compromise’ their
First Amendment rights.” 158 The Eighth Circuit also found that Tebeau’s
concern about the statute’s “chilling effect” was overstated because he
did not cite to any “case in which the government has charged another
music festival organizer under the statute, and [because his] own
involvement in the drug activities . . . was extensive.” 159
“Because a property owner is left guessing how to avoid liability,”
owners might simply take the “prudent approach and not hold a musical
event at all,” which would lead to the “chilling” effect of first
amendment free speech.160 Tebeau argued that “the Eighth Circuit
conducted a superficial analysis” of the two O’Brien prongs at issue 161
and that the Eighth Circuit failed to apply the court’s interpretation of the
O’Brien test as modified in Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence. 162 Tebeau claimed that the government could not pass the
standard set forth in Clark, namely, that “in analyzing content neutral
regulations the balancing must also take into account whether such
regulations leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.” 163
In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court of the United States
explained, “the threat of criminal prosecution for making a false
statement can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby
‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”164
Tebeau argued that by adhering to the plain language of the crack house
statute and by applying the mens rea requirement of the illegal purpose
to the actor in the statute, the appropriate “breathing room” would be
given to important First Amendment rights—playing and listening to
music. 165 With an additional mens rea requirement in tow, promoters
could continue holding festivals without the cloud of uncertainty
concerning liability under the crack house statute.166

158

Id. (citing Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574
(1987)).
159
Id.
160
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 10; see generally N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300-01 (1964) (The court noted its concern that an Alabama libel
law would “chill” free speech. The court found the law unconstitutional).
161
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 30.
162
Id.; see Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984)).
163
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 30; see Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
164
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 31-32 (quoting United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)). In Alvarez, the court held that the Stolen Valor Act was
a content-based restriction on free speech in violation of the First Amendment.
165
Id. at 32.
166
Id.
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ARGUMENT

A.
The Supreme Court Should Have Granted Tebeau’s
Petition for Certiorari.
Because some of Tebeau’s arguments have substantial merit and
because of the potential implications of the decision on the music
industry, there was significant reason for the Supreme Court to have
granted his Petition and reviewed the Eighth Circuit’s decision. In the
Petition, Tebeau argued:
The Court should grant certiorari because the Eighth
Circuit’s decision threatens important public speech
rights and creates uncertainty amongst musical festival
promoters over what, if any, precautions can be taken to
avoid liability under the crack house statute. Moreover,
the Eighth Circuit’s decision is inconsistent with this
Court’s prior decisions regarding statutory construction
and the proper analysis to be conducted for vagueness
and First Amendment challenges. 167
There is a three-part inquiry that must be satisfied in order for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari:
[T]here must be a reasonable probability that four
[m]embers of the Court would consider the underlying
issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari
or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a
significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s
decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable
harm will result if that decision is not stayed. 168
Tebeau’s prosecution will likely set a dangerous precedent for other
concert promoters. 169 Under the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, a concert
“promoter [could] be held liable under the statute if he makes his land
available for others to use [illegal drugs], even though his primary
purpose is to host a musical event.” 170 Tebeau’s argument that, “the
Court should address this issue now and not wait for such an issue to

167

Id. at 15.
See Beaver v. Netherland, 101 F.3d 977, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895-96 (1983)).
169
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 17.
170
Id.
168
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percolate in the other circuits,”171 was quite tangible due to the realities
of the live music industry today and the uncertainties created by the
current version of the crack house statute.
As discussed previously, 172 drug use at music festivals is prevalent
and the music industry is deriving more of its profits than ever from its
live music sector. Concert promoters and venue managers are not naïve;
they are aware that drug use and drug sales are transpiring, despite any
efforts to thwart such activities. Tebeau’s conviction and the Eighth
Circuit’s affirmance of the conviction appear to be focused on Tebeau’s
awareness that drug sales were going on at his festivals. While curtailing
the distribution of drugs appears to be at the heart of the crack house
statute, 173 what the Eighth Circuit and what Tebeau’s petition fail to
address substantially is that the statute also makes it illegal to “make
available . . . the place for the purpose of . . . using a controlled
substance.” 174
Although most concert promoters are not as lax as Tebeau regarding
drug distribution at festivals, drug use is inevitably happening. The
primary purpose of these legitimate promoters is to promote and to
present live music, but, because the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning was not
overruled and because authorities are able to attack promoters for
“knowingly” making their property available for drug use, these
promoters may be subject to prosecution under the crack house statute
based on the same reasoning by which Tebeau was convicted. The legal
difference between the two potential situations–where promoters are
facilitating the distribution or the use of drugs at their venues–is simply
that one focuses on the “distribution” provision of Section (a)(2), while
the other focuses on the “using a controlled substance” provision of
Section (a)(2). Without a controlling decision as to how this statute ought
to be interpreted and enforced in all federal Circuit Courts of Appeal,
Tebeau is justified in contending that concert promoters are left with
little guidance on avoiding prosecution under the crack house statute.
Although it is fairly clear that Tebeau made his property available for
drug use and drug distribution, the Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari in order to address these fundamental inconsistencies in the
current version of the crack house statute, which may very well lead to
its arbitrary enforcement. Under the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the crack
house statute could potentially be used to prosecute any concert promoter
or venue owner presiding over an event where drug use is occurring.
171

Id. at 18.
See infra Part II-A, C.
173
See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2012); 149 CONG. REC. 1846-48 (2003) (statement of
Sen. Biden).
174
149 CONG. REC. 1846 (2003) (statement of Sen. Biden) (emphasis added).
172
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Such a result will likely affect the entire live music industry, which will
in turn hurt the entertainment industry and the many local economies
benefitting from the substantial revenue live music produces.

B.
The Potential Implications of the Tebeau Decision Are
Worrisome.
In an age of a growing live music economy and an even faster
growing EDM market, copious “club drug” use is an inevitable problem.
Due to the significant health risks associated with such drug use and the
substantial number of drug-related deaths at EDM festivals, 175 the
government may have good reason to eventually pursue and prosecute
concert promoters and venue owners under the authority of the crack
house statute. The constituents of various congressional districts may
reasonably call on their representatives to rectify this problem, especially
as drug overdoses at festivals continue to be reported in the news.
Concert promoters and venue managers may very well become
unwarranted targets in the fight against dangerous “club drug” use.
The Tebeau decision may yield a limitless number of concert
promoter and venue manager arrests, even in situations where the facts
are not as compelling as they were in Tebeau’s case. As long as a thirdparty can satisfy the “intent” requirement, concert promoters will be
susceptible to prosecution under Section 856(a)(2). This is unfortunate
for many reasons. In Tebeau’s case, he actually took several, arguably
positive, safety precautions. He explicitly prohibited what he deemed to
be more “dangerous” drugs like crack-cocaine, methamphetamine, and
nitrous oxide at his events. 176 Cognizant of the on-going drug use, he set
up medical aid facilities to treat patrons who had overdosed after
ingesting illegal drugs. 177 He instructed security to remove people who
were out of control. 178 He tried, in his own, however misguided, way to
create a safe environment for his patrons to enjoy music, which he
claimed to be the primary purpose of his festivals.179
While the evidence shows that Tebeau intended to make his property
available for drug use, an affirmance of his conviction, without further
guidelines for concert promoters, may have dire consequences for the
industry. The fact that it is not possible to completely eliminate drug use
at music festivals was acknowledged by the applicable statute’s co175
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sponsors. 180 For the same reason, it is nearly impossible to eliminate drug
sales at music festivals. Because the statute prohibits making a property
available for drug use and because the Tebeau case allows for a
promoter’s conviction even where such an activity is not the primary
purpose of an event, the promoters of certain musical genres should
prepare for a series of future prosecutions as long as the Tebeau decision
stands and the text of Section 856 remains unchanged.
Further, given that the statute’s broader purpose is to curb drug use
and drug sales 181 and that the 2003 amendment expanded the statute to
apply to outdoor festivals,182 it is reasonable to expect the government to
pursue concert promoters and venue managers who may be associated
with genres of music known for substantial drug use. Just as ecstasy use
at raves was the public policy concern in 2003, 183 the increasing number
of deaths at EDM festivals today will likely catch the government’s
attention and may turn into someone’s political agenda.
The government may plausibly rely on the rampant drug use and
deaths at EDM concerns as ammunition to prosecute promoters of other
genres of music. Consider the promoters of Phish concerts. 184 It is fairly
common knowledge in the live music community that illegal drug use is
common at Phish shows. As VICE writer Dick Corvette jested, “One
does not simply walk into a Phish concert . . . not on drugs.” 185
Corvette’s VICE article highlights his experience attending his first
Phish show and the market of illegal drugs available there:
As with the Grateful Dead, there’s a weird little
economy that operates within the context of Phish.
People follow the band around, and then other people
follow those people around selling stuff to the people
following Phish around. It’s magical in its own way, and
more than a little exploitative. One of these streets, and
by far the most interesting one is called Shakedown
Street, which if you’ve ever been to a Phish show (or
Bonnaroo) before, is the “street” (read: row of cars) that
you can buy drugs and other stuff on. 186
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Due to the common knowledge that drug use occurs among the fans
of many varieties of musical genres, it is foreseeable under a Tebeau
regime that the promoters of these concerts, who are certainly aware of
the inherent drug use, will be prosecuted under the crack house statute.
During the first three nights of Phish’s 2013 Madison Square Garden
residency, at least 228 fans were arrested on drug charges. 187 This Note is
not advocating for the legalization of drugs 188 but rather for a realistic
assessment of the pervasiveness of drug use at many concerts and music
festivals. Phish is merely a paradigmatic example of drug use being
associated with a band’s fan base. 189 This example emphasizes the facts
that drug use and drug sales are occurring, concert promoters are aware
of their occurrence, and such a reality breeds potential abuse of the crack
house statute by authorities beyond the envisioned legislative purpose.
While the potential for increased prosecution against promoters
becomes a distinct possibility in the aftermath of the Tebeau decision, the
precise goals of the statute’s co-sponsors 190 remain overlooked. Senators
Biden and Grassley emphasized that the statute was crafted to go after
(1) promoters who seek to “profit” from drugs being used and sold at
their events and (2) those individuals whose main purpose is to provide a
venue for such activities. 191 Rather than accomplish these goals, in
upholding Tebeau’s conviction and rejecting his Petition, the Supreme
Court implicitly authorizes the punishment of a promoter (1) who shared
in none of the profits from the drug sales at his event and (2) whose main
purpose was to merely facilitate a music festival. The affirmance of
Tebeau’s conviction, therefore, has the effect of punishing the sort of
promoter whom the statute was not designed to pursue.

C.
The Crack House Statute Threatens the Profitability of the
Live Music Industry.
The Tebeau case primarily addresses the criminal repercussions for a
concert promoter for violating Section 856, but early critics of the 2003
version of the statute recognized the dangers of the civil penalties for

187
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which the statute provides.192 What will happen once a few more concert
promoters are criminally prosecuted under the crack house statute and
the families of drug overdose victims realize that those promoters are
also liable for civil penalties? In addition to possible wrongful death suits
and criminal prosecutions, promoters of all kinds could potentially face a
series of lawsuits under the crack house statute.
Rather than attracting additional corporate sponsors, the existing
sponsors previously mentioned in this Note 193 may shy away from such
involvement once they realize that the promoters with whom they are
doing business are civilly and criminally liable under the statute. Under
Section 856 (d)(2), “[i]f a civil penalty is calculated . . . and there is more
than [one] defendant, the court may apportion the penalty between
multiple violators, but each violator shall be jointly and severally liable
for the civil penalty under this subsection.” 194 If sponsors are determined
liable as co-defendants, their wallets, in addition to their reputations, will
likely suffer.
While there is no guarantee that such arrests or lawsuits will continue
to occur, recent deaths at EDM festivals 195 and the rising popularity of
the genre 196 will likely prompt awareness of the crack house statute
under which festival promoters may be prosecuted. Although Tebeau is
not a “major” concert promoter like Live Nation Entertainment,197 his
conviction should sound the alarm bells for corporate concert promotion
companies and their sponsors. If the government can make a case, with
analogous facts to the Tebeau precedent, against promoters who are
aware of the drug use present at their festivals, it is only a matter of time
before the major promoters and venue managers are attacked.
The dangers of “club drugs,” like ecstasy, have been a federal public
policy concern since the crack house statute was amended in 2003. 198 As
the popularity of EDM continues to evolve, there is good reason to
believe that the government’s next target for prosecution could be EDM
concerts, 199 in the same manner “raves” were targeted back in 2003. 200
As the profitability of concerts and music festivals continues to grow and
these event revenues continue to support the music industry, the threat of
192
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major promoters and venue managers being arrested and sued, combined
with the possibility of major sponsors abandoning their interest in live
music, may have extremely damaging effects on the industry and reverse
the positive industry trends of the last several years.

D.

The Music Industry Should Lobby on Tebeau’s Behalf.

As demonstrated, Tebeau’s case is representative of the dangerous
path that lies ahead for the live music industry. 201 It is in the interest of
the industry, and of the many sectors of the economy that profit from live
music, to lobby in support of Tebeau’s contentions and to raise
awareness of the issues at hand. To be successful in their efforts, these
potential Tebeau supporters should be aware that although Tebeau put
forth several respectable statutory arguments that can greatly help their
cause, his conviction was likely justified.
Because Tebeau allegedly gave his security staff clear permission to
allow certain types of drug sales at his events, 202 it would have been very
difficult to overturn the conviction under the current version of Section
856(a)(2). Although Tebeau did not profit from the drug sales directly, 203
he arguably profited indirectly because certain drug dealers, who would
have likely known about the festival security’s laissez faire attitude
toward drugs like marijuana, mushrooms, and LSD, likely paid for
admission to the festival for the specific purpose of selling illegal drugs.
Tebeau’s best chance to overturn his conviction would have been to
focus on his arguments that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and
that its effects are contrary to the statute’s purpose.
Because a festival promoter or venue manager can be held liable for
the acts of others who use his property, there is little guidance as to what
precautions ought to be taken to avoid liability under the statute. While
the major concert promoters take significantly more safety precautions
than Tebeau did with regard to drug sales at their events, Tebeau’s
proponents can argue that, under the statute, the commonplace nature of
drug use at such events remains problematic. As long as the current
iteration of the statute remains and the Tebeau precedent stands, the
shadow of his conviction will loom over concert promoters nationwide
who surely cannot prevent all drug distribution and use at their events.
Although Tebeau’s First Amendment argument may appear
overstated, 204 the inevitability of pervasive drug use at many music
festivals may lead certain promoters and venue managers to abandon
201
202
203
204
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specific endeavors for fear of prosecution, with the resultant effect being
the “chilling” of free speech.205 In the Petition, Tebeau should have
dedicated more time to this argument and should have provided the
Supreme Court with the factual background highlighting the substantial
scope of the statute’s reach. The cumulative effects of a Tebeau
precedent may very well curb the number of music festivals and concerts
in certain genres of music for as long as promoters and venue managers
lack the guidelines necessary to take sufficient precautions to immunize
themselves against prosecution under the statute.
Moreover, Tebeau’s proponents should dissect both the 1986 version
and the 2003 version of the statute and emphasize the reasons and
purpose for each version’s enactment. 206 They should argue, in detail,
that the goals of the 2003 version are not being realized by the Tebeau
decision. Just as the 1986 version was meant to address a specific
problem dealing with crack houses,207 the 2003 version was meant to
address a specific problem dealing with high instances of ecstasy use
among young people in the rave scene.208 Congressional intent for both
of these bills focused on cutting down the instances of drug use, the
specific drug depending on the time period.209 If legitimate promoters
and venue managers are attacked under Section 856 and legitimate
venues are shut down, it is reasonable to surmise that young people will
seek alternative, illegitimate venues to enjoy their music and to
potentially use drugs. The more guidance and support the government
can give to legitimate promoters and venue managers, the more the
congressional intent of the statute can be realized.
Lobbyists on Tebeau’s behalf should not underestimate the
potentially devastating impact on certain local economies that may result
from the Supreme Court’s decision to let the Eighth Circuit’s holding
stand. While Tebeau’s festivals took place in rural Missouri, 210 host cities
of major festivals around the nation, which have grown accustomed to
the jobs and economic boost that such festivals yield, 211 may be
significantly affected if the festivals were substantially scaled back or
fully shut down. The impact on the national economy could be
substantial, as the live music industry has come to generate billions of
dollars per year. 212
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

See infra Part IV-F.
See infra Part III-A, C.
See infra Part III-A.
See infra Part III-C.
See infra Part III-A, C.
Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 957.
See infra Part II-B.
See infra Part II-A-B.

2014]

MOLLY AND THE CRACK HOUSE STATUTE

125

Moreover, as long as the statute is not applied universally, 213 and
only certain promoters are prosecuted under its current form, it leaves
open the potential judicial discretion that allows a court to twist the
content of the statute to reach a variety of conclusions in different
situations. Music industry lobbyists must stress that if Section 856 were
actually applied universally under the Tebeau rationale, all promoters
aware of drug use at their festivals could theoretically be prosecuted.
Based on the realities of the live music culture today and the fact that
most promoters and venue managers are aware of what is going on, such
a class of potential convicts would be enormous.

E.

Popular Culture’s Acceptance of Drug Use Is Problematic.

Clearly, music festivals and concerts need to be made safer, and
attacking the drug use and drug sales at these events seems to be a
rational method of achieving such a goal. The 2003 amendment to the
crack house statute, while primarily aimed at rogue concert promoters,214
was also an attempt to attack the “club drug” epidemic on a larger
scale. 215 When addressing some of the critics of his bill, Senator Biden
explained,
the answer to the problem of drug use at raves is not
simply to prosecute irresponsible rave promoters and
those who distribute drugs. There is also a responsibility
to raise awareness among parents, teachers, students,
coaches, religious leaders, etc. about the dangers of the
drugs used and sold at raves. 216
Senator Grassley noted the problematic acceptance of such drug use
among young people claiming, “[m]any young people perceive Ecstasy
as harmless.” 217 The social and cultural acceptance of Ecstasy has
arguably increased since the EDM scene emerged from the underground
to the mainstream. Now, young people are ingesting MDMA at major
music festivals 218 rather than at “underground raves.” 219 While the
statute’s co-founders sought to raise awareness of the dangers of club
213
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drugs among “parents, teachers, [and] students,” 220 a more concerted
effort must be made to address the actual festival attendees. It would be
in the best interest of all involved if the amount of drug use in the live
music scene were curtailed. In order to do this successfully, upgrading
standard security measures at concerts and music festivals will likely be
insufficient. The culture itself needs to change.
Madonna’s 2012 antics and her decision to title her album
“MDNA” 221 exemplify the popular culture’s acceptance of “club drug”
use. 222 She provides an excellent example of precise behavior that
musicians should avoid in front of impressionable, young music fans.
Musicians like Madonna and EDM DJs like Calvin Harris have the
power and influence to help diminish the acceptance of ecstasy in the
EDM culture. These artists have the opportunity to highlight the dangers
of “club drugs” and to encourage their fans to enjoy their music without
the “aid” of those drugs. The music industry should give serious
consideration to a marketing campaign demonizing the use of these drugs
in a similar fashion to anti-cigarette and drunk driving campaigns that
have become so prevalent in our society.
In the same way many famous rappers have been vocal proponents in
anti-violence campaigns, often expressing such sentiments in their
songs, 223 EDM artists have a real opportunity to make a difference.
Although such an idealistic and likely all-too-hopeful plan to help shape
the culture may be unlikely to succeed without the backing of serious
players in the industry, it just may suffice for a new beginning. However,
until a plan with similar goals gets moving and has time to yield results,
drug use will remain rampant, and concert promoters and venue
managers will consequently remain vulnerable to prosecution.

F.
There is an Inherent Problem With the Current Wording of
the Statute.
Tebeau presents a valid argument regarding the unambiguous nature
of the statute because the statute’s language is clear on its face.224
Although promoters and venue managers are undoubtedly aware that
220
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illegal activities are occurring at certain events, this awareness does not
mean that they are intentionally making the venue available for that
purpose as the statute prohibits. 225 This begs the question of whether the
Eighth Circuit’s reading of the statute can be deemed an example of
excessive judicial discretion. By allowing the “intention” requirement of
the statute to be substituted by third parties, the precise wording of the
statute appears to be ultimately ignored.
If the goal of the statute is to curb drug use and drug sales,226 then
the repercussions for violating the statute should be designed to achieve
that purpose. Punishing promoters and venue managers for activities that
will inevitably occur at such events hardly accomplishes that goal. As the
recent deaths at music festivals have shown, the current version of the
statute is doing little, if anything, to keep festival patrons from using
dangerous drugs. The focus of the concert promoters and venue
managers should be on curtailing the drug use and drug sales at these
festivals, and the statute needs to help facilitate such efforts. Searches by
security, removal of overly intoxicated patrons, and medical aid stations
are all necessities that the current version of the statute fails to address.
Rather than being used merely to prosecute concert promoters and
venue managers, the statute should provide guidelines for these actors to
appropriately curb the drug use and drug sales at their events. As written,
the statute provides a blanket provision that gives no such specifications.
Until the current version is amended, the state interest of curbing drug
use is not being achieved, and promoters are exposed to arbitrary
prosecution. If courts are attributing the statutory “intention” requirement
to third parties, an additional legislative provision to the statute is
necessary to prevent inequitable application.

G.

The Best Solution Is to Amend the Statute, Again.

In order to address all of these issues in a permanent and substantial
fashion, a simple reversal of the Tebeau decision by the Supreme Court
may not have sufficed. If the Court had taken the case and issued an
opinion, concert promoters would likely still have little guidance about
how to avoid liability while simultaneously providing the safest possible
environment for their patrons. To avoid such a situation, Congress should
consider another amendment to the crack house statute. 227 In the same
fashion that the 2003 amendment sought to address a pressing issue at
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the time, 228 a 2014 amendment to the statute could address the dilemma
that has presented itself today. My proposed amendment to Section 856
(a)(2) would make it illegal to:
[M]anage or control any place . . . and knowingly and
intentionally . . . make available for use . . . the place for
the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance 229 [if the
actor does not take reasonable precautions (1) to
prevent these activities and (2) to provide necessary
health and safety measures for patrons].
Such a “reasonableness” test allows for different levels of
precautions to be taken at different types of events. For example, EDM
concerts with teenage and young adult fans will likely require more
health and safety precautions than a jazz concert with an older patronage.
A balancing test would encourage courts to issue judgments based on the
necessities demanded by a particular genre of music, the location city,
the particular venue, those in attendance, and the time of year. Outdoor
festivals like Electric Zoo, in the heat of a New York summer, will
inevitably require more precautions than an indoor, air-conditioned
venue. Although this suggestion appears initially vague in and of itself,
and may be susceptible to the same analogous possibility of judicial
discretion that this Note has previously critiqued,230 such an amendment
would, at the least, give concert promoters some sort of standard by
which they can conduct their affairs. A fact-specific inquiry is justified
due to the virtually unlimited number of scenarios that can occur.
Courts will be able to consider several factors under the new test.
Were there enough law enforcement personnel on site or nearby? What
instructions were given to venue security? Were security personnel
targeting all types of drug use and drug sales, or were they being
selective? Could security reasonably eliminate all drug use, or did they
do the best they could under the circumstances? Were enough medical
precautions taken to ensure the safety of patrons? Were overtly
intoxicated individuals removed and given adequate medical attention?
Were there enough water stations?
All of these factors need to be addressed in order to achieve the state
interests of curbing drug use and drug sales at these events and protecting
the wellbeing and the safety of concert patrons.231 While such an
228
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amendment would help to protect festival promoters and venue managers
from arbitrary prosecution, it would not diminish the central purpose of
Section 856, which is to combat the problematic drug use of the day and
the related dangers. 232

VI.

CONCLUSION

The current version of Section 856 (a)(2) reaches an unreasonably
large class of people, namely concert promoters and venue managers,
who are left with little guidance about how to avoid liability when
hosting a music event. A second amendment to the statute, adding a
reasonableness test, would address Tebeau’s textual, due process, and
First Amendment concerns, while maintaining the statute’s core purpose.
Just as the 2003 amendment was passed to address a public policy
concern of the day, this second amendment is needed to address a
modern substantial policy concern.233 As the statute currently stands,
Tebeau’s conviction was likely justified. However, as long as the
intention element in Section 856 (a)(2) can be transferred from third
parties to the defendant in crack house statute cases, concert promoters
and venue managers around the country are in danger of being
prosecuted for merely being passively aware of the drug use at their
events.
To protect promoters and venue owners, to save the industry, and to
protect the health and safety of music festival patrons, Congress needs to
fix these statutory problems. Although the Supreme Court would have
been wise to take the Tebeau case in order to address these concerns,
Congress would save significant time and unnecessary litigation costs for
the government, and for countless future defendants, by passing a new
bill as soon as possible. Such a change is necessary for the future of the
music industry and the national economy as a whole, as billions of
dollars are at stake. For live music’s sake and for the sake of the music
industry at large, the crack house statute needs to be amended, again.
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